Abstract
The emergence of 15 independent states, many of which did not have a tradition of separate statehood, on the territory of the Soviet Union (USSR) at the end of 1991 almost immediately actualized the problem of ensuring their external security. On 15 May 1992, six months after the collapse of the union, the leaders of the politically close countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) 3 in Tashkent. Some time later, the leaders of three other post-Soviet states signed instruments of accession to the CST: the Republic of Azerbaijan (24 September 1993), Georgia (9 December 1993) and the Republic of Belarus (31 December 1993). These countries had been unable to join the CST in May 1992 due to certain external and internal complexities. At that time Armenia and Azerbaijan were in a state of war and were fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh. The situation was compounded by political instability in Azerbaijan. It was also a difficult time for Georgia, where an acute struggle for power was accompanied by interethnic clashes. Belarus experienced its own difficulties. Since the country declared neutrality after the collapse of the USSR, it was necessary to overcome the prejudices held by that part of society that perceived the CST as leading to the creation of a new military-political bloc [Bobkov, 2011, p. 282] . Thus, among the CIS countries only Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Moldova, which had declared their military neutrality, remained outside the CST.
Having passed the necessary procedures, the CST was ratified by all parties and entered into force on 20 April 1994. It was set to last for a five-year period with the possibility of subsequent extension. In accordance with article 102 of the United Nations (UN) Charter the CST was registered with the UN secretariat 4 on 1 November 1995. Given the aspirations of the participating states to create their own national armed forces, the CST was intended to fill the legal lacuna with regard to the lack of regulations in the agreement establishing the CIS related to mutual obligations to ensure collective security. 5 Two principal provisions are enshrined in the CST. First, its participants have undertaken obligations that they "will not enter any military alliances or take part in any groupings of states as well as in actions directed against some other State Party" (art. one). Second, article four states that "if an aggression is committed against one of the States Parties by any state or a group of states, it will be considered as an aggression against all the States Parties to this Treaty. In case an act of aggression is committed against any of the States Parties, all the other States Parties will render it necessary assistance, including military one, as well as provide support with the means at their disposal through an exercise of the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter."
In this context, it is important that the content of the CST has been focused on protecting its participants from external threats and has not imposed provisions on the organization of peacekeeping operations, including in the post-Soviet space. The corresponding measures at that time were conducted under the aegis of the CIS.
Thus, in the CST itself and in the subsequent activities of the participating states, the ideas of mutual assistance in case of armed attack on any of them, and of collective action to curb and eliminate the consequences of such an attack, have been laid down and legalized. The CST became a key instrument to preserve and jointly defend the national sovereignty of the newly independent states in the absence of full-fledged independent armed forces and special services. However, one cannot but appreciate that according to some researchers, the impetus for cooperation within the framework of the CST at that time was more the desire to preserve the remnants of the Soviet value system and ideological community than it was about the need to repel external threats [Nikitina, 2009, p. 148] which probably took place. But the dominating reason could be the apprehension felt by the new countries entering into the system of international relations without military and political guarantees.
In fact, the CST had initially been considered a dimension of the Commonwealth of Independent States: nine out of 12 CIS countries participated in it, although a number of its bodies (the councils of foreign affairs and defense ministers and the military cooperation coordination headquarters) worked only within the CST. The limited institutional arrangements reduced the function of the CST to the provision of selective assistance to establish armed forces in the participating states and the development of legal frameworks. Due to this, the CST was not able to be a sufficiently unifying factor. Objective reasons have also played their part. The military and military-technical ties between the new states, which were in a state of deep crisis, have begun to be curtailed. The discrepancies between them on the problems of foreign policy have intensified as demonstrated by the transition of some countries from the CST to the GUUAM grouping of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
On 10 October 1997 during the Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg, the leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova established a union known as the GUAM, which later became the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development [Yaz'kova, 2005] . The communiqué adopted at the end of the Strasbourg meeting formalized the gradual political rapprochement and practical enhancement of coo peration between the countries, two of which were participants in the CST. Its characteristic feature was an orientation towards European and international structures. On 24 April 1999 Uzbekistan, 6 another participant of the CST, joined the GUAM forum. This event was announced at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) anniversary summit in Washington during which the heads of the now-expanded GUUAM states adopted the Washington Declaration proclaiming integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures to be a goal [Torkunov et al., 2005, pp. 855-856] .
This happened at the same time as the expiry of the five-year period of the CST's duration and formally explains why three countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan, refused to extend it [Nikolaenko, 2004, pp. 47-48] . 7 Tbilisi and Baku explained their withdrawal in terms of the insufficient effectiveness of the CST in the settlement of conflicts. S. A. Abiyev, the minister of defense of Azerbaijan, explained his country's decision by declaring that the system of collective security had proved incapable of reducing even internal contradictions between its participants, not to mention external global threats, and that this had led to the disillusionment of a number of states [ShKVS, 2002, p. 21] .
Meanwhile, other parties to the CST (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) signed a protocol on its extension. 8 The reduction of the CST's membership has complicated the efforts to create a wide collective security system in the post-Soviet space, but at the same time has enabled the possibility of establishing a classical military and political alliance under the leadership of Russia.
It should be noted that the change in the initial membership of the CST took place against the backdrop of significant changes in the international environment, including an unprecedented surge in the terrorist threat, radical nationalism and religious intolerance. The number of clashes on ethnic grounds, which often turn into armed conflicts, has significantly increased. The Taliban regime established in Afghanistan has approached the southern borders of the CIS and has strengthened the support of extremist and terrorist forces in the Central Asian states. The invasions of armed bands into Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000, as well as clashes in one of the Uzbekistan regions in 2000 only reaffirmed the conclusions that a practical implementation of the Islamic extremist plan to expand its zone of influence from Afghanistan to the north, primarily to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, was underway. 9 This substantial aggravation of the international environment in the late-1990s and early-2000s necessitated the intensification of cooperation between the parties to the CST and the encouragement of new areas for cooperation beyond the military component. This was evidenced by an analysis of the collective experience of countering terrorism, which has been shown to have a close relationship to other contemporary security issues. A comparable challenge has been introduced by illegal drug trafficking, the profits from which have often been used to finance terrorist and extremist activities. In turn, the drug menace started to come not only from the Asian direction, where the politically unstable Afghanistan remains the main manufacturer and supplier of drugs to the world market, but also from European countries that have turned out to be the largest centres for the production of synthetic drugs. Increasing migration flows in the absence of uniform rules for the migrants' movement and employment or common visa policies have created an obvious risk of fueling organized crime and the social resources 7 In this regard, the original designation of the CST as the Tashkent Treaty is almost out of use. 8 of international terrorism. Challenges of responding to emergency situations and collective prevention and mitigation of the consequences of natural disasters, caused in particular by events of anthropogenic origin, have also emerged. In other words, participation in the CST began to demand a more advanced and qualitative level of military and political integration leading to the formation of truly allied relations [Bordyuzha, 2008, p. 25] . Under these circumstances, the seniors of the participating countries developed an awareness of the necessity to move to a new format of ensuring overall multidimensional security in the form of a full-fledged organizational structure that can allow the expansion of the list of interaction areas in the interests of all its members, and which creates an institutional mechanism necessary for the successful implementation of the stated objectives.
This process of CST transformation began in 2002. On 14 May in Moscow the leaders of the CST states decided to establish a new full-fledged international organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
10 On 7 October 2002, the charter and the agreement on the legal status of the CSTO were signed in Chisinau. The provisions fixed in these documents have significantly deepened the political and legal foundations of the 1992 CST, expanding the norms related to collective security and introducing elements to counteract internal threats. The charter has specifically stipulated the impossibility of deploying third-country military assets on the territory of the CSTO members without prior consultations.
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The charter and the agreement were ratified by the participating states and entered into force on 18 September 2003. On 2 December 2004, the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the CSTO. Thus, an international integration association which consolidated the efforts of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan to ensure regional security and stability was created.
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It is worth noting that the CSTO, which has replaced the "declarative interaction" of the CST participants in the 1990s, soon enough manifested itself as an extensive institutional structure. The collective security council, which consists of the heads of CSTO states, has become the supreme body of the organization. The network of responsible officials' councils has been expanded. With the increased scope of the organization's objectives, the committee of security council secretaries has been added to the councils of ministers for foreign affairs and defense ministers. A permanent council working on a regular basis and consisting of plenipotentiary representatives of the CSTO states has been established. Along with the CSTO's political pillar, the military component of the organization was enhanced. In 2001, before the creation of the CSTO, a decision was made to form the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian region. These forces included national battalions from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. These units regularly conduct exercises primarily for the purpose of working out counterterrorism tasks.
These are the main milestones in the process of transforming the contractual obligations which had determined the interaction parameters of CST members in order to create a multidimensional regional security organization which has allowed the intensification of efforts to control counterterrorist and antidrug activities, to counteract illegal migration and to develop cooperation mechanisms in the field of emergency response.
A logical and significant stage in this transformation was the formation of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) in 2009, the prototype for which was the Collective Rapid Deployment Force of the Central Asian region. The new coalition grouping has absorbed military contingents and special forces units from all CSTO members.
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As for Uzbekistan, Tashkent refrained from participating in the CRRF. The Uzbek leader declared that he was ready to delegate military units to the force only if it was necessary for conducting joint exercises or in case of a real threat to CSTO members' security.
14 However, the Uzbek military units have never appeared in the CRRF.
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Nevertheless, the size of the CRRF military contingent is about 20 thousand people, which allows it to take on not only military tasks related to aggression or armed attacks on members, but also to combat various forms of terrorism and extremism, to stop illicit drug trafficking and to mitigate the consequences of emergency situations.
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The international legal institutionalization of the CSTO has also continued, although we cannot fail to note differences in the vision of this organization held by its participants. An important step towards strengthening the legal basis for the interaction 13 On 14 June 2009 in Moscow a session of the collective security council was held at which the decision to create the CRRF was taken. However, Belarus refused to participate in the session due to the so-called "dairy war" with Russia, arguing that without the cessation of actions undermining the basis of the partners' economic security it was not possible to take decisions on other aspects of security. Nevertheless, the decision to establish the CRRF at the summit was adopted by the other members. The Republic of Belarus joined the agreement on the CRRF in October 2009 [Bobkov, 2011, pp. 286-287] .
14 Uzbekistan Withdraws from the CSTO (2012) MirPolitiki.net, 1 July. Available at: http://mirpolitiki. net/politika/uzbekistan-vyshel-iz-odkb-20120701.html (accessed 16 November 2017). 15 On 28 June 2012 Tashkent sent a note to the CSTO secretariat about the suspension of its participation in the organization's activities. The Uzbek ministry of foreign affairs reported that the reason was the disagreement with the organization's plans for Afghanistan. In addition, the plans for strengthening military cooperation between the CSTO countries were not sustainable for Tashkent. Source: Way Out (2012) Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2 July. This step did not come as a surprise taking into account that Uzbekistan's position, after the resumption of membership in the CSTO, initially contained many reservations regarding the directions and depth of military cooperation. Thus, Tashkent once again publicly demonstrated the revealed tactical behaviour in the military and political sphere. 17 The substance of the amendments made to the treaty and the charter has dealt with the clarification of the list of possible threats and the statutory consolidation of the expansion of the organization's activities. Thus, "threat to the stability of one or several participating States" 18 has appeared in the list of possible threats that trigger the joint consultations mechanism aimed at coordinating the positions of the participating states in the treaty (article two). In turn, the charter (article eight) requires that members take measures to create and operate within the organization a system to manage crisis situations that threaten the security, stability, territorial integrity or sovereignty of members, and to interact in the areas of state border protection, information exchange, information security, population and territorial protection in emergency situations of natural and anthropogenic origin, as well as from hazards arising from military action.
19 Thus the course of the CSTO's transformation into a multifunctional security organization, launched in 2006, has been fixed in the CSTO's constitutional documents.
The CSTO's prevailing attitude to the comprehensive security of its members, expressed in its multidisciplinary mandate, is in the opinion of some experts not the result of a thoughtful development strategy, but rather the result of the historical logic of the organization's formation. In particular, at various stages and affected by a variety of factors and events, the CSTO has inherited a number of different elements (for example, three geographically separated security regions) and directions (for example, peacemaking and technical covering of the railways), which have been difficult to transform into a unified development strategy or a holistic logical organizational structure [Nikitina, 2009, pp. 147-148] .
Such an assessment, expressed during the CSTO's formation, no longer corresponds to the existing state of affairs and has been conceptually refuted by the CSTO Collective Security Strategy for the period up to 2025, approved in 2016. According to this document the CSTO's strategic objective is to ensure collective security by consolidating the efforts and resources of the CSTO members on the basis of a strategic partnership which in turn involves expanding political cooperation, improving the defense capabilities, combat readiness and combat capability of CSTO members' armed forces, as well as countering transnational challenges and threats. The last, along with terro-rism, extremism, illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration and emergency situations, mentioned above, also includes information security and state border protection.
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A key element in the implementation of the collective security strategy is the organization's crisis management system. It is a combination of interstate interaction mechanisms aimed at prompt management of crises that threaten the security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of CSTO members.
At the same time, it should be noted that the political and legal framework for the functioning of the crisis management system dates back to 2010. Then, the internal political confrontation in the Kyrgyz Republic had led not only to an unconstitutional change of power in the spring of 2010, but also had provoked clashes between supporters of new and old political forces. Ultimately, this led to interethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the south, during which hundreds of people were killed and hundreds of thousands were forced to flee their homes.
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Taking into account the experience gained in assisting the Kyrgyz Republic to stabilize the situation on the part of the CSTO, the organization has developed and approved procedures for crisis management. Priority has been given to political means of preventing (settling) crises, including the appointment of an authorized person granted with a mandate on behalf of the organization, as well as procedures for providing logistical, survey missions and humanitarian and other assistance [Golub, 2014, pp. 29-30] .
It is expected that the implementation of political measures, aimed at resolving a hypothetical crisis situation, can be provided by CSTO peacekeeping forces as well as other means of the organization. Currently, the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the CSTO Secretariat and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, aimed at training CSTO members' peacekeeping contingents in accordance with UN standards, are being implemented and international experience in conducting peacekeeping operations is being considered. If the crisis situation is caused by aggression or other armed attack, the CRRF may be involved in its settlement.
The aforesaid makes it possible to conclude that the Collective Security Treaty Organization has an undeniable specificity that does not allow one-dimensional comparisons with other regional organizations. The CSTO's systemic novelty is first, that it combines several "baskets" in its structure and provides a joint response to traditional external military threats based on deep military, military-technical and militaryeconomic cooperation. Second, it provides joint resistance to new challenges and threats, involving daily interaction of special services and law enforcement agencies. Third, it is an end-to-end crisis management system, allowing for an increased impact in the settlement of possible crisis situations. All this suggests that over 15 years of activity the CSTO has accumulated a significant political potential which allows it to maintain a common military and strategic space, backed by mechanisms for concessional provision of allied armed forces with modern military and special equipment, and joint training of personnel in the relevant educational institutions of the member states. It is able to provide a deterrent effect based on the demonstration of the collective forces' capabilities during regular joint combat and special training activities, and ensures daily cooperation of law enforcement agencies and special services in pressing areas such as combating illicit drug trafficking and countering criminal activities in the information and computer field. It also works to promote regional conflict settlement, such as the previously discussed civil confrontation in Kyrgyzstan or border conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2014. 22 Such a comprehensive approach plays a decisive role in multilateral efforts to create a security system in Eurasia. It also responds to the intentions of the members that the CSTO should be an important instrument contributing to peace and stability, ensuring their security and sovereignty. 
